Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation-and thus scientific reasoning in general.
1 The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour.
Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the follm.ving: given that scientific reasoning and thus confirmation is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation of pro bability has to be given up in order to get right confirmation, and thus scientific reasoning in general.
This will be argued for as follows. First, an example will be considered that is an instance of a more general version of the problem of old evidence (POE). This suggests that we look whether the two existing solutions to POE conditioning on the entailment relation (Garber [1983] ) and the counterfactual strategy (Howson & Urbach [1993] ) provide a solution to the more general problem (called C, for 'counterintuitive').
As a first result, we get that these two solutions to POE are not genuine solutions, because they do not provide a solution to the more general C. More importantly, the solutions to C considered here all have in common that they depend on the agent's very first guess, her first degree-of-belief function Pro. C thus leads to the problem of prior probabilities (POPP). However, the standard solution to POPP the 'washing out of priors' relying on convergence to certainty and merger of opinion (cf. Earman [1992] , especially pp. 57 9 and ch. 6) is not applicable here, because the solutions to C never get rid of the agent's first degree-of-belief function Pro.
On the subjective interpretation of probability, Pro is any arbitrary assignment of values in [0, 1] to the atomic propositions of the underlying language. By choosing an appropriate Pro, one can obtain more or less any degree of confirmation. The only way out is some kind of objective or logical probability function that the agent could adopt as her first degree-ofbelief function Pro. However, the difficulty of determining such a logical probability function was precisely the reason for turning to the subjective interpretation of probability.
2 Bayesian confinnation theory According to Bayesian confirmation theory, an agent's degree of confirmation of hypothesis H by evidence E relative to background knowledge B is measured by some function C Pr such that where Pr is the agent's degree-of-belief function. Any such function C Pr is called a relevance measure (based on Pr).
One example is the distance measure d pr : dp,(H, E, E) ~ Pr(HIE, E) -Pr(HIE). where Prl is her degree-of-belief function at f 1 . El is her background knowledge at that time, which contains the information that Stephen is Scottish. Because she knows that H and El logically imply E, the agent gets interested in whether Stephen is indeed wearing a kilt. So she puts on her glasses and has a careful second look at Stephen, who still seems to be wearing a kilt; this all happens at time t 2 .
In passing from tl to [2, the only change in the agent's degrees of belief is in E. Moreover, for some reason, the agent cannot express her observation in terms of a proposition. So her degree of belief in E increases exogenous!y, say to
where Pr2 is the agent's degree-of-belieffunction at t2. Her background knowledge B2 at t2 is the same as at t I , because the only change is in E and that change is exogenous, i.e. not due to any proposition that is fully believed and could thus be conditioned on. So BI is logically equivalent to Bb BI == B 2 . E is positively relevant for H given BI (in the sense of PrI). Furthermore, the agent's degree of belief in E increases from PrI(EIB I ) = .6 at tI to Pr2(EIB2) ~.9 at t2. Therefore, by Jeffrey conditionalisation, her degree of belief in H must also increase, namely from PrI(HIB I ) to 4 The less reliable the source of information, the higher the degree of Bayesian confIrmation where the only change in the agent's degrees of belief in passing from tl to t2 is exogenous and in E, whence El is logically equivalent to E 2 , and Jeffrey conditionalisation (JC) is used. Here and in the following, the probabilities of all contingent propositions involved are assumed to be positive.
C is counterintuitive, because E which is positive evidence for hypothesis H should not provide less and less confirmation for H when it becomes more and more established, much less cease to provide any confirmation in the limiting case when it becomes a certainty (which is the problem of old evidence). On the contrary, the more certain it becomes that such positive evidence E is true, the more this should support H. I Itiscrucial tonotethatwhatis compared here are not the degrees of confirmation obtained by two distinct pieces of evidences El and E2 but the degrees of confirmation obtained by one and the same piece of evidence E at two successive points in time (which may also be viewed as two possible worlds, in which case the use of Jeffrey conditionalisation is not justified). As mentioned above, these different degrees of belief in E at two successive points in time lead to different degrees of belief in H (unless E is irrelevant for H). Prl(H I B I ) and Pr2(H I B 2 ) are related as dictated by Jeffrey conditionalisation. This means, in particular, that they are not assumed to be the same (unless E is irrelevant for H).
IfsomeEspeaks in favour of some H say, because it is a logical consequence of the latter then getting to know that E is pro bably false should not provide confirmation for H; rather, H should be disconfirmed by that. On the other hand, getting to know that E is probably true should provide confirmation for H and the more probable it is that E is true, the more it should do so.
Finally, instead of considering tl and t2 as two successive points of time, one may view them as two possible situations or worlds differing from each other just in the respect that the agent's degree of belief in E is lower in tl than in t 2 .
If Hand B (== Bl == B,) logically imply E, or more generally, if Prl(EIH, B)=Pr, (E,H, B) and Prl(HIB) and Pr,(HIB) are assumed to equal each other,2 the following holds, independently of whether E is positively or negatively relevant for H given B: H is more confirmed by E relative to B in t l than in t2 just in case the agent's degree of belief in E in t l is lower than in t2.
Measure sensitivity
As shown by Fitelson ([2001] ), many arguments in the literature on Bayesian confirmation theory are measure-sensitive in the sense that their validity depends on which relevance measure one takes as measure of confirmation.
The example of the preceding section (C) is no exception. C holds for the distance measure dpn the log-likelihood ratio lpn and the ratio measure rpn (Christensen [1999] ),3
because the latter is invariant with regard to exogenous belief-changes in It
Indeed, the same holds true of every function of Pr(HIE, B) and Pr(HI~ E, B).
In case of Cp, (Carnap [1962] ):
something different but not much better holds:
Pn -,E, El 6 A more general version of the problem of old evidence C is a more general version of the problem of old evidence (PO E). C says that evidence E which is positively relevant for hypothesis H given background knowledge B 5 provides more confirmation for H relative to B, the less the agent believes in E. In the limiting case of POE where E is known, E ceases to provide any confirmation at all. Conversely, if E is negatively relevant for H given B , E provides the less disconfirmation for H relative to B, the more the agent believes in E. In the limiting case of POE where E is known, E ceases to provide any disconfirmation at all. POE is that evidence E that is old in the sense that being assigned a degree of belief of I cannot provide any confirmation, since for any Pr, H, E and B:
POE is a problem, because there are historical cases in which old evidence did provide confirmation (for hypotheses, both old and new; see chapter 5 of Emman [1992] for an excellent discussion).
If POE is a problem, so is C. This is important, because a Bayesian could simply refuse to consider C as counterintuitive. Is it not rational, she might say, that I take positively relevant E to provide the less confirmation for H, the more I already believe in E and have built this belief into my degree of belief in H?6 5 By the Duhem-Quine thesis, confirmation is always relative to a set of auxiliaries. Instead of interpreting B as background knowledge, B may be viewed as such a set of auxiliaries. This is particularly attractive if one considers the background knowledge to be summarized by the degree-of-belief function Pr (and not as a proposition). I owe this view of the background knowledge to Christopher Hitchcock. This reply is perfectly reasonable, but it applies equally well to POE. However, a brief look at the literature shows that Bayesians do take POE to be a problem.
So let us look whether the existing solutions to POE give rise to a solution to C. Generally, there are two ways of approaching POE: 1) Conditioning on the entaihnent relation: Garber ([1983] ), Jeffrey ([1983] ), Niiniluoto ([1983] )7 2) Counterfactual strategy: Howson & Urbach ([1993]) Each of these will be considered in turn.
Conditioning on the entailment relation
The idea here is to distinguish between a historical and an ahistorical POE and to solve the former by noting that what increases [the agent]'s confidence in [H] is not E itself, but the discovery of some generally logical or mathematical relationship between [H] and E. (Garber [1983] , p. 104)
Then one shows that even if Pr(E.IB) = 1, the discovery that [H entails E] can raise [the agent]'s confidence in [H] . (Garber [1983] , p. 123)
Conditioning on the entailment relation does not provide a solution to C, because in our example the agent is only interested in E because she knows that the conjunction of Hand BI logically implies E (and does not forget this and that Stephen is Scottish), whence Prj(H entails EIBj) = 1, for every point of time tj,j 2: 0 Moreover, by substituting ' H entails E' for E, one gets another instance of C: given that 'H entails E is positively relevant for H given B, it provides more confirmation for H, the less the agent believes in it. However, if E is not kno-wn, it cannot be dropped from B. Therefore one has to generalize from the case ofPOE where Pr(EIB) = 1 to the case ofC where Pr(£"B) needs not be l.
The question is, of course, how the counterfactual strategy can be adequately generalized. Apart from the above, there are the following (and uncountably many more) formulations of cl Pr (H, E, B 9 Generalizing the counterfactnal strategy Instead of considering 'the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not yet know E (Howson & Urbach [1993] , p. 405), the quotation suggests considering the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not yet believe in E to degree Pr(ElB). However, in our example the background knowledge at tl and at t2 is the same, because the change in the agent's degree of belief in E is exogenous. Therefore one cannot just drop something (say, all information bearing on E) from B2 to get a counterfactual supposition that could play a role analogous to that of B2 -E in the special case where Pr2(EIB2) = l.
Instead, one really has to adopt a new pro bability function Pr. Suppose, therefore, that pr(X] B) is the agent's degree of belief in X on the counterfactual supposition that she does not yet believe in Eto degree Pr (E I B) . Then there are the following (and uncountably many more) ways of generalizing a: 10 The desired result, and a necessary and snfficient condition for it Instead of arguing for or against any of these generalizations, let us first have a look at where we want to arrive. According to Bayesian intuitions, the desired result is that H is more confirmed by Erelative to B2 at t2 than relative to B1 at t1 ifand only if the agent's degree of belief in E given B2 at t2 is greater than her degree of belief in E given B1 at t1, i.e.
Cm (H, E, B 2 The reason is that in going from tl to t2 the only change in the agent's degrees of belief is exogenous and in E, and Prf(HIBi)just is the agent's degree of belief in H on the counterfactual supposition that she does not yet believe in E to degree Pr,(E,B i ).
Interestingly, E sheds positive light on gl and gs, in which BI and B2 are assumed to be logically equivalent:
1) E is necessary and sufficient for g l to satisfy Dc, assuming 'counterfactual Jeffrey conditionalisation', i.e. prf (HI±E, B 1 
2) E is necessary and sufficient for gs to satisfy D A , assuming Jeffrey conditionalisation.
Moreover, E reflects badly on gi, i = 2, 3, 4. Given counterfactual JC,
3) E is necessary and sufficient for g2 to satisfy F, and 4) E is necessary and sufficient for g3 to satisfy Gc-Given JC, Here 5) E is necessary and sufficient for g4 to satisfy G A.
Gc Cp,,(H, E, B , ) (H, E , Bi) F is odd because it says that it does not matter whether E is positively relevant for H given BI (= B 2 ) in the sense of Prior Pr2. Gc and G A are odd for a Bayesian, because they have confirmation being invariant with regard to exogenous belief changes in E. They yield that the differences in the agent's degree of belief Pri(EIBi) in E at different times t i are irrelevant for the comparison of her degrees of confirmation of Hby E relative to Bi at the times t i . For this reason the knock-do\Vll feature that confirmation is dependent on the agent's first degree of belief function Pro is also true for any measure satisfying G A or Gc.
All things considered, it seems fair to say that the proper generalisation of d' is gl or gs. In order to get confirmation right, they both require counterfactual degrees of belief to be stable over time. gl where the only changes in the agent's degrees of belief in going from to to ti are exogenous and in E , making Bo logically equivalent to B j for any j, 0 :::; j:::; i. Obviously, g5(H, E, B) is positive if and only if 0'
Pri(HIBi) > Pr!i (HIBo) which generalizes o.
gl (H, E, B) is positive if and only if Pc Pr!i(EIH, Bo) > Pr!i (EIBo) &Pri(EIBi) >Pr!i (EIBo) or
which seems to be the appropriate generalisation of P in terms of counterfactual degrees of belief.
11 Actual degrees of belief "Whether or not the preceding generalizations are appropriate, they are not satisfying, because it remains questionable how the agent's counterfactual degree-of-belief function Pr" (-IB) is determined and related to her actual degree-of-belief function Pr (-IB) . This question being unanswered, the counterfactual strategy does not provide a genuine solution to C. Let us therefore consider an account couched solely in terms of actual degrees of belief (and providing a possible answer to the aforementioned question).
Generally, the example in Section 3 is one in which evidence E is positively relevant for hypothesis H given the agent's current background knowledge B according to her current degree-of-belieffunction Pr; and her degree of belief in E changes exogenously as time goes on. If there is an increase (decrease) in the agent's degree of belief in E given B, her degree of belief in H given B increases (decreases), too and conversely, if E is negatively relevant for H given B according to Pr. All Bayesian accounts of (incremental) confirmation measure in some way the difference between Pr (HIE, B) and Pr (HIB) Given Bayes or strict conditionalisation, this is just the difference between the agent's prior and posterior degree of belief in H given Bwhen she learns E and nothing else.
The counterfactual strategy measures the difference between the agent's actual or posterior degree of belief in H given B and her counterfactual one the latter replacing her prior. The reason is that the prior and posterior degrees of belief in H given B coincide if E was already known.
Solving C requires something more general, because in C the agent does not learn or know E; there is only a change in the agent's degree of belief in E given B. This suggests considering the agent's prior and posterior degree of belief in H given Bwhen the only change in her degrees of belief is exogenous and in E. In other words, one replaces strict conditionalisation by Jeffrey conditionalisation.
However, one cannot simply take the difference between Pri(HIEi) and Pri 1 (HIEi rl
For suppose the agent's degree of belief in E increases enormously between t i _ 2 and ti_I, say from Pri 2(EIEi 2) ~ .01 to Pri 1 (HIEi rl ~ .9
and then it increases again in going to ti, but only slightly, say to
Then the difference between Pri 2(HIEi 2) and Pri 1 (HIEi I) is much greater than the difference between Pri 1 (HIEi rl and Pri(HIEi)
Consequently, the difference between the prior and posterior degree of belief in Hat ti-I is much greater than that at ti, although the agent's degree of belief in E at t i -I is smaller than at t2, i.e.
IPri(HIE) -Pri 1 (HIE) I < IPri 1 (HIE) -Pri 2(HIE)1 and
Pri(EIE»Pri I(EIE)
The absolute value is needed for the case in which E is not positively but rather negatively relevant for H given B in the sense of Pri-2. "What one must consider instead is the difference between the agent's current degree of belief in H, Pri(HIEi) and her first degree of belief in H, Pro(HIBo) , where the only changes in her degrees of belief in going from to to ti are exogenous and in E. The proposal, therefore, is:
The agent's degree of (incremental) confirmation of Hby Erelative to Bi at time ti is given by a generalized relevance measure, i. e. some function g(O, i) =: g such that g(H, E, E) > 0 '* Pri(HIE, Ei) > Pro(HIEo) g(H, E, E) ~ 0 '* Pri(HIE, Ei) ~ Pro(HIEo) g(H, E, E) < 0 '* Pri(HIE, Ei) < Pro (HIEo) where the only changes in the agent's degrees of belief in going from to to ti are exogenous and in E (in which case Bo == B j , for every j , 0 ::; j ::; i).
An example is the generalized distance measure g6, g6 (H, E, Bi) 12 The common knock-down featnre, or 'anything goes' All three measures gl, gs and g6 (and also g3, g4, s, and every function of Pr (H lE, B) and Pr (HI~E, B) ) have in common that their values essentially depend on the agent's first degree-of-belief function Pro.
In case E is known and logically implied by Hand B, the agent's degree of confirmation of H by E relative to B at time ti (measured by g 6) is even uniquely determined by her initial guesses in E and H, Pro(EIB) and Pro(HIB)! Why the exclamation mark? First, because this shows that the idea behind any Bayesian theory of confirmation namely to determine an agent's degree of confirmation by her actual subjective degrees of belief is shown to fail. Second, because by the subjective interpretation Pro is any arbitrary assignment of values in [0, 1] to the atomic propositions of the underlying language, and thus by choosing an appropriate Pro, one can obtain more or less any degree of confirmation.
For let r be any value in the interval 
is a conditional probability function (defined on the same ((1-) field as Pri and conditional on the same background knowledge E) that yields that &,p,,(H, E, E) 
where Pri results from Pro by Jeffrey conditioning i times on E and where the agent's degrees of belief changed exogenously and only in E in going from to to t i · Indeed, under this assumption that E is not independent of H given B (in the sense of Pr i) one can have, for every generalized relevance measure, whatever one pleases: confirmation, disconfirmation, or irrelevance!8 Simply choose r from the above interval> 0 for confirmation, < 0 for disconfirmation, and = 0 for irrelevance. Then Pro as defined above yields the desired result, for any generalized relevance measure, since 13 The problem of prior probabilities Thus we are back at the problem of prior probabilities (POPP). According to Earman ([1992] ), there are three answers to this problem:
The first is that the assignment of priors is not a critical matter, because as the evidence accumulates, the differences in priors 'wash out.' [ ... ] [I]tis fair to say that the fonnal results apply only to the long run and leave unanswered the challenge as it applies to the short and medium runs.
[ ... ] The second response is to provide rules to fix the supposedly reasonable initial degrees of belief. [ ... ] We saw that, although ingenious, Bayes's attempt is problematic. Other rules for fixing priors suffer from similar difficulties. And generally, none of the rules cooked up so far are capable of coping with the wealth of information that typically bears on the assignment of priors. [ ... ] The third response is that while it may be hopeless to state and justify precise rules for assigning numerically exact priors, still there are plausibility considerations that can be used to guide the assignments. [ ... ] This response [ ... ] opens the Bayesians to anew challenge [ .. .] . That is, Bayesians must hold that the appeal to plausibility arguments does not commit them to the existence of a logically prior sort of reasoning: plausibility assessment. Plausibility arguments serve to marshall the relevant considerations in a perspicuous fonn, yet the assessment of these considerations comes with the assignment of priors. But, of course, this escape succeeds only by reactivating the original challenge. The upshot seems to be that some fonn ofthewashout solution had better work not just for the long run but also for the short and medium runs as well. (Eannan [1992] , pp. 57 9) I take the standard Bayesian answer to be that differences in the priors do not matter, because they are 'washed out' in the long run.
However, this solution is not applicable here and would not be even if the limit theorems of convergence to certainty and merger of opinion worked for the short and medium runs as well. For g6 and company never get rid of the agent's first degree of belief function Pro.
The example shows that differences in the priors do matter. Unless E is irrelevant for H given B according to the agent's actual degree of belief function Pri' the agent's first degree of belief function Pro can be used to obtain a positive or a negative value (or 0) for any generalized relevance measure g (H, E , B) provided E is among the atomic statements.
The only way out is some kind of objective or logical probability function the agent could adopt as her first degree of belief function Pro. Yet the difficulty of determining such a logical probability function just was the reason for turning to the subjective interpretation! Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government through a Sofja Kovalevskaja Award.
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